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In economic models of crime individuals respond to changes in the potential value of criminal 
opportunities. We analyse this issue by estimating crime-price elasticities from detailed data on 
criminal incidents in London between 2002 and 2012. The unique data feature we exploit is a detailed 
classification of what goods were stolen in reported theft, robbery and burglary incidents. We first 
consider a panel of consumer goods covering the majority of market goods stolen in the crime 
incidents and find evidence of significant positive price elasticities. We then study a particular group 
of crimes that have risen sharply recently as world prices for them have risen, namely commodity 
related goods (jewellery, fuel and metal crimes), finding sizable elasticities when we instrument local 
UK prices by exogenous shifts in global commodity prices. Finally, we show that changes in the 
prices of loot from crime have played a role in explaining recent crime trends. 
Keywords: Crime, goods prices, metal crime, commodity prices 
JEL codes: K42 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Communities Programme. The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
We would like to thank participants at the 2013 UCL Economics of Crime workshop, the NBER 2014 
Summer Institute (Crime/Labour Studies), the 6th Transatlantic Crime Workshop in Milan and the 
2015 Royal Economic Society Conference for their comments, along with participants in seminars at, 
Bath, Birmingham, CERGE-EI Prague, Duke, ECARES-Brussels, EIEF-Rome, EUI Florence, 
Harvard, Kellogg, Leicester, LSE, Northwestern, St Andrews, Sussex and UCL. Aleksandra Katolik 
and Sebastian Schwarz provided excellent research assistance 
Mirko Draca, Department of Economics and Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global 
Economy at University of Warwick. Associate at the Centre for Economic Performance, London 
School of Economics. Theodore Koutmeridis, School of Law and CREATe: RCUK Centre for 
Copyright and New Business Models in the Creative Economy, University of Glasgow. Stephen 
Machin, Department of Economics, University College London and Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics. 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 M. Draca, T. Koutmeridis  and S. Machin, submitted 2015. 
1 
1. Introduction
The extent to which criminals respond to changing economic incentives forms a cornerstone of 
the economic approach to studying criminality. The impact of economic incentives, as formally 
outlined by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), turns on a prospective criminal weighing up the 
expected benefits of illegal activity against the benefits of staying within the law. Most of the 
evidence that exists on the question of expected benefits considers how changing labour market 
incentives in the legal market can affect crime participation decisions of individuals on the 
margins of crime. Some evidence seems to support the notion that labour market outcomes that 
underpin the legal sources of returns, such as low wages or youth unemployment, matter for 
crime.1   
Less studied has been the question of how changes in the direct benefits or returns to 
criminal participation in illegal activity affect observed crime levels. Probably the explanation 
why is the practical difficulty in eliciting good information on the actual or potential returns from 
crime. While there is a series of studies on the structure of criminal incomes (see, for example, 
Viscusi, 1986, or Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000), there is limited evidence on how changes in the 
value of alternative criminal opportunities drive these incomes. 
In the case of property theft (which makes up approximately two-thirds of total crime in 
the US and Europe2) a key determinant of the benefits derived from crime is the financial value of 
stolen property, which is important both in terms of the resale potential of the property and as a 
1
 The large literature on crime and unemployment is reviewed by Freeman (1999) who argues that, whilst some 
studies do find a significant association between crime and unemployment, many do not. He concludes that the 
evidence is ‘fragile, at best’. Work since the Freeman review does seem to uncover more robust findings for the 
crime-unemployment relationship amongst youths (see Fougère et al., 2009, or Gronqvist, 2013, and the evidence on 
crime scarring from entry unemployment by Bell et al., 2014). The smaller body of work on crime and low 
(unskilled) wages also reports significant associations (see Gould et al., 2002, and Machin and Meghir, 2004). 
2
 See Buonanno et al. (2011). They calculate that US and European property crime rates run at between 35-50 crimes 
per 1000 members of the population in the period since 1990, while total crime is in the 50-70 crimes per 1000 range. 
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source of personal consumption utility for the criminal. This means that the changing market 
prices of goods and services may have scope to affect criminal participation decisions. 
This question is fundamental to the issue of how the return to types of property crime may 
change, yet there are few empirical studies of the relationship between prices and crime. An 
exception is Reilly and Witt’s (2008) time series analysis of burglaries and the changing price of 
audio-visual goods. Also, in criminology there are a small number of case studies focused on 
goods such as copper cable (Sidebottom et al., 2011, 2014), electrical equipment (Wellsmith and 
Burrell, 2005) and livestock (Sidebottom, 2012). These studies, following the criminological 
approach outlined by Clarke (1999, 2000), have stressed the role of a range of price and non-price 
attributes in determining rates of theft across goods.3  
In economics, studies that have considered issues indirectly related to the question of value 
and returns include: work on the impact of security technologies (for example, Ayres and Levitt, 
1998, and Vollaard and Van Ours, 2011, 2015); research on the link between crime and stolen 
goods markets (Miles, 2007, and d’Este, 2014); the influence of smuggling on cigarette demand 
(Gruber et al., 2003, and Lovenheim, 2008);4 and experimental work testing how changes in the
value of loot affect the incentive for theft (Harbaugh et al., 2013). 5
On one level, the lack of study of crime and prices might be thought of as surprising. 
Police forces are often seen to run dedicated enforcement campaigns around the theft of 
commonly held, high-value property types. As an example, London’s Metropolitan Police Service 
3
 Specifically, Clarke (1999) outlines a taxonomy whereby the theft rate of item is determined by the extent that it is 
“CRAVED” in terms of the attributes of: Concealability, Removability, Availability, Value, Enjoyability, and 
Disposability. We take some inspiration from this approach in our paper by distinguishing between the sources of 
price and non-price heterogeneity across goods that determine the expected return to theft.  
4
 We mention this literature on cigarettes because, while it focuses primarily on health and taxation issues, it also 
brings into play the modelling of movements in an incentive for illegal activity (that is, how changes in taxes affect 
the returns to smuggling). 
5
 See Draca and Machin (2015) for a more detailed review of the literatures on criminal earnings, the impact of 
security technology and other studies that discuss the determinants of the returns to crime. 
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(MPS) has run high-profile public initiatives in recent years focusing on jewellery and mobile 
phone theft, such as the prominent “Operation Ringtone” in 2013 which involved around 5000 
officers in measures to reduce phone theft. 6  This was conducted alongside a general public 
awareness campaign around both electronics and jewellery-related crime.7
Adding to this, the media has also linked falls in the burglary rate to the falling prices of 
home electronic goods.8 Empirically, there is prima facie evidence to support such a link. Figure
1, drawn from the database we have constructed for this paper, shows monthly trends in crime 
shares and price indices for two selected goods - audio players and watches - over the 2002 to 
2012 time period. The indexed trends shown in the Figure make it clear that crime shares of the 
former audio player group fall in tandem with prices, while there is an increase in the crime shares 
of watches as this category of goods became more valuable over time. 
Study of the more general empirical connection between crime and prices forms the 
subject matter of our paper. We do this in various ways. After outlining a simple theoretical 
approach to modelling crime and prices, we first begin our empirical analysis by examining 
whether the changing prices of a range of consumer goods affects both the level and composition 
of crime across property types. To do so, we utilise detailed monthly data on burglaries, thefts and 
robberies in London from the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) between January 2002 and 
December 2012. In particular, the unique data feature we exploit is that we know the type of 
property that was stolen in the reported incidents, since the MPS uses a comprehensive 2-digit 
coding system as part of its standard crime reporting format. This information on crime by 
6
 See Home Office (2014)  and BBC News (2013) “Arrests after Met Police Crackdown on Mobile Phone Thefts” for 
details on Operation Ringtone. 
7
 See Metropolitan Police Service (2013). This initiative was a radio and poster campaign that highlighted in 
particular the street robbery risks of prominently displaying jewellery and encouraged members of the public to 
exercise extra caution when wearing or carrying these items. 
8
 See for example, the Economist (2013) and Morris (2014). 
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property type is then matched to detailed retail goods price data from the UK Office of National 
Statistics (ONS) to form a consumer goods panel that we use to study how different price 
movements across goods may affect crime patterns. In this analysis, we estimate crime-price 
elasticities using panel data models that relate changes in the quantities of stolen goods to changes 
in their prices. These results are also compared with estimates from a rather different source, a 
victimization survey (the British Crime Survey, BCS) where we can also consider how changes in 
what is stolen relate to changes in the reported value of the item. 
The second main part of our crime and prices analysis then focuses on a set of commodity-
related goods – jewellery, fuel and metals. These goods have the feature that they are relatively 
homogenous in their quality and that their prices are strongly determined by price movements in 
international commodity markets. This allows us to track the response of crime to price changes in 
a clean setting where prices are set exogenously and the quality of the underlying good is fixed 
over time. 
Our analysis uncovers a strong link between changing prices and crime. For the consumer 
goods panel we estimate an average elasticity of 0.35. For metals we estimate an elasticity of 
above unity, revealing a very strong sensitivity of crime to price changes. Furthermore, the 
empirical framework we adopt addresses a large range of potential confounders that could 
influence the crime-price relationship. Firstly, the approach we outline for the 44-good panel 
explicitly addresses the issue of non-price sources of heterogeneity across goods. In particular, the 
fixed effects model that we adopt is able to absorb many important dimensions of goods 
heterogeneity. By this we mean variation in features such as crime success probabilities (for 
example, the fixed technological costs of stealing a particular type of good) or resale price 
depreciation factors (i.e. the markdown between a new good valued at retail prices versus a resold 
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version of the good). These factors will, along with price, determine the expected return from 
stealing a good and our main strategy here is to difference them out. This approach of course 
leaves us with parameters measuring the effect of changing prices on changes in crime at the 
within-good level. 
Practically, the credibility of this approach then depends on crime adjusting to changes in 
prices at a faster rate than we could plausibly expect the non-price characteristics to adjust to the 
same stimulus. Our monthly models of the lag structure of the crime-price relationship strongly 
indicate that this is the case, with the majority of the response of crime to prices occurring within 
the first three months of a given shock to prices. This rapid response of crime to prices greatly 
limits the scope for time varying unobservables correlated with prices to play a role in influencing 
the observed relationship. As an example, any confounders related to factors such as investments 
in extra security by victims, the stock of goods held by the public, or changes in unobservable 
product quality would need to operate at a similar rapid frequency (and magnitude) as the 
measured price changes, which is arguably unrealistic at the monthly level. 
 The last part of our analysis of the 44-product panel looks at the potential bias from 
endogenous crime reporting behaviour. As prices rise and goods become more valuable, owners 
are more likely to report that an item has been stolen and, since our MPS data is indeed based on 
crimes officially reported to the police, this could account for some of the observed positive 
relationship between prices and crime. We therefore construct a further goods-level panel using 
the annual British Crime Survey (BCS), which, as a victimization survey, distinguishes between 
reported and non-reported crime. We find that the crime-price relationship is robust using this 
broader definition of crime and that the potential biases from endogenous reporting are minimal. 
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We then move on to study metal and other commodity-related crimes (namely fuel and 
jewellery). Recently, there has been a huge upsurge in metal-related crimes in particular, with 
many reports of infrastructure-related thefts from targets such as public buildings and railway 
lines. 9  The prices of metals have risen very sharply through the 2000s as rapidly growing
countries (especially China) have increased their demands for these metals. A very good example 
is the case of copper where prices have been driven up very sharply by demand from China. Thus 
exogenous increases in world prices have caused thieves to concentrate their activities into 
stealing metal, a crime where the monetary returns are much higher now than in the past. In a 
similar fashion, goods like jewellery and fuel are also exposed to changes in prices (specifically 
the prices of gold and oil respectively) that are primarily determined in international markets. 
Our analysis of commodity-related crimes has two main advantages. Firstly, in the case of 
metals we are able to obtain direct resale prices in the form of detailed reports from scrap metal 
dealers. This allows us to overcome the problem of measurement error that comes up when we 
proxy street resale values with retail prices, as we do in the previous consumer goods panel. 
Secondly, this study of commodity-related crimes allows us to parse out the biases related to 
unobserved demand shocks at the goods-level. By this we mean increases in the demand that 
would simultaneously increase prices and consumer demand for particular goods. This is a 
problem insofar that an increase in demand could translate into increases in consumer holdings of 
the good and make the good easier to steal at the same time that prices are rising. However, the 
shifts in demand that we observe for the commodity-related goods are very clearly exogenously 
set by trends in global markets rather than demand in the UK. 
9
 See for example, the review by Bennett (2008) which provides UK examples such as “240,000 passenger minutes 
lost in 2006” due to delays caused by copper cable theft. Kooi (2010) provides a guide to US metal theft trends and 
Berinato (2007) provides an evocative account of the US copper theft epidemic as a “red gold rush”.  
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Thus, overall, we find property crime to be responsive to changes in both consumer and 
scrap metal prices. The notion that increases in the potential takings from crime generate ceteris 
paribus increases in crime is central to the economic approach to modelling crime. Our evidence 
of significant positive consumer and scrap metal price elasticities of crime strongly supports the 
notion that criminals react to changing economic incentives by carrying out crimes that yield a 
higher return. In other words, our results indicate that the supply of crime is elastic both within 
and across activities, with relatively fast adjustment to changes in potential returns. 
The finding of significant and positive crime-price elasticities shows that prices matter for 
crime, and so we conclude the analysis of this paper by considering the quantitative importance of 
changing prices in explaining crime trends in the period we study. In our data, aggregate property 
crime fell by 35 percent between 2002 and 2012. For our estimated crime-price elasticities from 
the consumer panel, we find that price variation accounts for somewhere around 20 percent of the 
crime drop. One way of thinking about this is that the falling real price of loot meant that crimes 
that would have occurred in the past did not occur because the returns available from them 
significantly decreased. An extreme example of this is the very rapid fall in the price of audio 
players. The real fall here was even sharper so that price falls accounted for almost 40 percent of 
the crime drop for this good. Similarly for the highly price elastic metal crimes, where rapidly 
rising world commodity prices actually drove crime up, we find that the vast majority of the metal 
crime can be accounted for by real price increases. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 so as to motivate our empirical 
analysis we develop a simple choice theoretic model where crime and prices are connected to one 
another and from which we derive the prediction of a positive crime-price elasticity. In Section 3 
we describe the data and offer some descriptive analysis. Section 4 reports the modelling 
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approaches we implement. Section 5 gives the results from the consumer panel, and Section 6 
from the analysis of commodity and metal crimes. In Section 7 we offer some interpretation and 
discussion of our results, together with a decomposition of the importance of price changes for 
explaining crime trends. Section 8 offers some concluding remarks. 
2. Modelling Crime and Goods Prices
The starting point is a standard model of crime and economic incentives following, for example, 
the way Freeman (1999) or Machin and Meghir (2004) set up the classic Becker (1968) or Ehrlich 
(1973) model for use and implementation in empirical work. We extend this, without loss of 
generality, to consider choices of theft across different consumer goods which sell at different 
prices. In the first step, we reiterate the usual homogenous agent-homogenous good case and then 
go on to outline a simple homogenous agent-heterogeneous good model that can be applied to our 
empirical setting. In particular, the model shows how a straightforward price elasticity can be 
derived and also helps to clarify the role of factors such as wages, the level of sanctions, and the 
probability of detection or capture in relation to the crime-price elasticity that we are interested in. 
A general set-up of the model is as follows. If P is the gain from successful crime, π the 
probability of being caught, S the punishment if caught and W the gain from legitimate labour, 
then the decision-maker will chose to commit crimes when the following inequality, which 
compares the expected returns from crime to the legal labour market wage, holds: 
(1 – πgi) Pg – πgi Sg > Wi (1) 
In (1) the subscript gi on the probability of being caught π reflects heterogeneity in both 
the good to be stolen g and the type of individual thief i (e.g. a burglar or robber). The gain P 
reflects the market value of the good g to the thief (i.e. its resale value or personal value to the 
9 
thief). Legislation punishes all individuals equally for thefts of a given type of good g, while 
wages depend also on the type i of the individual thief.  We now examine different cases that 
allow for the goods g and criminals i to vary in terms of types, starting by shutting down both 
sources of heterogeneity. 
Homogeneous Agent - Homogeneous Good 
When both agents and goods are homogeneous there is only one crime choice to be made. 
The decision to commit a crime with return P occurs when the inequality below holds: 
(1 – π) P – π S > W (2) 
Notice that equation (2) is the same as (1), except the subscripts g and i are dropped, as all goods 
and all individuals are identical. The inequality in this case is, of course, the standard one from the 
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) economic model of crime. 
Homogeneous Agent - Heterogeneous Goods 
This is the most relevant case for our empirical exercise, since in the data we have 
information about the type of the thieves is limited but we can in detail identify the type of stolen 
good. Specifically, we can only characterise the type of criminal from modes of crime (i.e. 
burglary, theft, or robbery) rather than observing individual criminals specialising in the theft of 
particular goods. Hence, in this case the basic inequality becomes: 
(1 – πg) Pg – πg Sg > W (3) 
which means that the individual takes more than just one decision about whether to engage in 
crime or not. Instead, they compare the net benefit of stealing over alternative goods, denoted by 
g. So if there are two products, indexed by 1 and 2 respectively, and if inequality (3) holds for
both of them, the thief still has the choice between the two goods. Conditional upon doing crime, 
10 
an individual would therefore choose to steal good 1 rather than good 2 if also the inequality 
below holds strictly: 
(1 – π1) P1 – π1 S1 > (1 – π2) P2 – π2 S2 (4) 
However, as crime for good 1 increases in the society, the gap between the left and right 
hand side of the expression above declines. An equilibrium with crime in both products occurs 
when the expression holds with equality. The natural way to model this is to allow the probability 
of being caught to change, for instance π1 should increase as crime opportunities for good 1 
become scarce in the short run. Intuitively, this means that stealing property of type 1 is less risky 
in the beginning (as in what might be thought of as a low-hanging fruit explanation): however, as 
more thieves choose to steal the same good, the probability of being caught increases.10 That is 
why we can express π1 as an increasing function of the quantity theft of property 1 so that π1 = k 
C1 with k being positive. 
By treating expressions (3) and (4) as equalities we can derive the quantity of crime in 
equilibrium. For one good only, we have 
(1 – k C1) P1 – k C1 S1 = W (5) 
which can be rearranged as: 
C1 = (P1 – W) / [k (P1 + S1)] (6) 
Equation (6) shows that a wage increase results in a fall in stolen quantities. The intuition 
behind this  is simple: when wages from legitimate labour increase, the outside option is more 
attractive and fewer criminals decide to steal. Similarly, equation (6) also shows that an increase 
in the sanction associated with being caught for stealing the good 1, S1, decreases the stolen 
quantity. 
10
 This is essentially what Ehrlich (1996) characterises as the demand side of the market for offenses. 
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Taking the partial derivative of (6) with respect to price and multiplying by (P1/C1) gives a 
crime-price elasticity: 
(∂C1 / ∂P1) (P1/C1) = {(S1 + W) / [k (P1 + S1)2]} (P1/C1) (7) 
In (7) it is clear that the elasticity of crime with respect to prices is always positive, so that 
increases in the price of good 1 generate increases in stolen quantity of product 1. However, 
notice that (7) describes the response of crime to price changes for a single product. The model 
can be further developed by adding a second good to make the role of relative prices between 
goods explicit. To introduce the second good, we first assume that both wages and sentences are 
the same for potential criminals choosing between goods. That is, the punishment for stealing 
product 1 or product 2 is the same (S1 = S2 = S) and the certainty equivalent legal wage is W. This 
makes the decision of whether to steal good 1 as opposed to good 2 solely driven by the relative 
prices of good 1 and 2. We return to this point about equal punishments across goods when 
discussing our empirical specifications in the next section below.11 Therefore, analogous to the
expression for good 1 in (5), the crime-work choice equality for good 2 is: 
(1 – kC2) P2 – kC2 S = W (8) 
Thus, after some rearrangement, for the two goods case we can derive: 
C1 = [(P1 – P2 + kC2 (P2 + S)] / [k (P1 + S )] (9) 
We can then derive a crime-price elasticity for good 1 as 
(∂C1 / ∂P1) (P1/C1) = {(S + P2)(1-kC2) / [k (P1 + S)2]} (P1/C1) (10) 
In this two-good model, again the crime-price elasticity is always positive. Recall that quantities 
and in particular kC2 replaces the probability of being caught π2, which takes values from 0 to 1. 
11
 The issue needs discussion because, while sanctions like sentences for particular crimes tend to be fixed (e.g. if 
they are mandated or if sentencing guidelines exist) in some circumstances they vary. Two examples from the 
economics literature include Kessler and Levitt (1999) who study sentence enhancements to do with the California 
three-strikes laws and Bell, Jaitman and Machin (2014) who study the tougher sentences given to individuals who 
were convicted for participating in the London riots of August 2011. 
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Wages do not affect the price elasticity when there are two goods in the society. This is intuitive, 
as wages affect the choice between crime and legitimate labour but they do not affect the decision 
between stealing good 1 and 2, conditional upon the choice to do crime rather than work, provided 
that legal wages are sufficiently low that render crime profitable for both good 1 and good 2.12
3. Data and Initial Descriptive Analysis
Our analysis matches data on crime to prices, with an aim of estimating empirical crime-price 
elasticities. We do this in two main ways. We first put together sources of crime data matched to 
the prices or values of what was stolen for a number of market goods. Second we look specifically 
at commodity and metal crimes, in part because they have seen a significant rise in prices over the 
period we study, and also because we can consider plausibly exogenous price variations driven by 
prices in international commodity markets. Furthermore, in the case of metals we have accurate 
price data from scrap metal dealers, which are the actual resale prices on offer to criminals. 
Crime by Property Type 
We draw on two sources to study crime by property type. The first is administrative data 
drawn from the Crime Record Information System (CRIS) of the London Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS).  The second comes from survey responses on crime victimization from the British 
Crime Survey (BCS). We have obtained monthly data between 2002 and 2012 for the MPS crime 
data, and look at annual data from the repeated cross-sections of the BCS over the same period. 
The CRIS represents the Metropolitan Police’s standard reporting format for crimes. As 
part of this standard format, the MPS uses a coding system to describe the type and count of 
12
 Another result from this model is that a low level of wages is associated with a low overall price elasticity. The 
intuition is straightforward: when wages are low, say close to zero, almost everyone steals, as the outside option of 
work is not attractive. In this case an increase in prices cannot shift many from legitimate labour to crime, since most 
of them already engage in criminal activity. 
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goods stolen in thefts, burglaries and robberies. The structure of this coding system broadly 
resembles the analogous systems used for economic data on retail/wholesale goods or on 
internationally traded goods. Specifically, the property types are coded at two-digit level, with 203 
products distributed across 19 one-digit product categories. The latter are listed in Table A1 of the 
Appendix, together with crime shares by one-digit category. 
The British Crime Survey (BCS) is a crime victimization survey which, since 2001 when 
it was restructured into a larger survey than before, asks around 40,000 individuals in households 
about their crime experiences in the previous year.13 It is useful to us as it has information on what
was stolen in crimes and thus offers a complementary data source for us to study. Furthermore, 
the BCS also has questions asking whether a crime was reported to police or not. This is useful for 
gauging the potential scope for endogenous reporting by victims, that is, increases in recorded 
crime driven not by an increase in underlying quantity stolen but rather by the fact that the stolen 
items could have become more or less valuable to victims over time. 
ONS Product Prices 
For some of the product groups in the CRIS data we can match the crime counts in each 
month between January 2002 and December 2012 to product price data from the UK Office of 
National Statistics (ONS). The product price data is based on the price quotes data that underpins 
the calculation of the UK Consumer Price Index (CPI). The data contains the original quoted 
prices that the ONS draws from shops across the UK, that is, the actual price in pounds and pence 
of goods being sold on store shelves.14 The quotes data gives us the flexibility to aggregate the
shop-level information to product level and calculate price indexes from the ground up, setting the 
13
 The British Crime Survey began in 1982 and was first a biennial survey and remained a smaller scale survey until 
being overhauled in 2001 to become the much bigger survey of around 40,000 adults per year. The survey has (more 
accurately) been renamed the Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW) since 2011. 
14
 The data contains information from 1,701 different shops on the prices of 992 different products defined according 
to the goods classification used by the ONS (where the nomenclature term is item id). 
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base period to January 2002, the first month in the MPS crime data. In cases where the ONS does 
not make the shop-level price quotes data available we use their calculated price index 
information, re-setting the base values to January 2002. 
Matching MPS and ONS Product Groups 
 We matched the MPS product codes to the ONS retail price codes by inspecting the label 
descriptions for the codes across the datasets. This is only feasible for the crimes with market 
codes in the MPS data and we cannot match the stolen property which is classified to be non-
market (around 49.2 percent in terms of crime counts) such as credit cards or personal documents 
that cannot be priced because they are not tradable in conventional retail or second hand markets. 
A further “rare/unusual” group (around 3.3 percent of crime counts) contains property types such 
as those related to animals or weapons that also cannot be feasibly matched to a consistently 
reported price series. 
For the market goods, however, the high level of detail in the ONS price data makes it 
possible to find credible matches for many two-digit goods categories reported in the MPS 
property type system. For example, we are able to find separate matches amongst prices for the 
different types of clothing covered in the MPS data (e.g. menswear, ladies wear, children’s) and 
for different types of electronic, durable and food products.15 In total, we were able to match 44 
crime and goods categories for all months between January 2002 and December 2012, comprising 
approximately 77.5 percent of the market good crime counts. From this we have formed a 
balanced panel of crime counts and retail prices across 132 monthly periods. The remaining 22.5 
percent could not be matched because of either incomplete crime or price data.16
15
 An example of the label description matching is given in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
16
 For example, the Metropolitan Police added new categories after 2002 as they became prominent as distinct goods 
categories (e.g. MP3 players were included from 2006), and the ONS regularly revises and drops price series in ways 
15 
BCS Value of Stolen Property 
For the British Crime Survey there is also data on the reported replacement value of what 
was stolen in victim-reported criminal incidents. We can thus form an analogous data set to our 
MPS crime-consumer goods panel by looking in each year how many items were stolen and we 
can work out the their average value. Hence this is a direct measure of the value of the item stolen 
and provides an alternative to our measure based on the retail price index. We do not have as 
much detail as the MPS data but have been able to put together data in 2002 and 2012 on 22 
items, some of which match those in the MPS data, together with their average replacement 
value.17 We use this below to draw a comparison with results using the MPS consumer panel.
Metal Crimes 
The MPS product coding system features a one-digit group of metal crimes.18 Apart from 
indirect cases such as gold’s close relationship with jewellery products, the price of these metals is 
not measured as part of the CPI calculations, so we have collected direct data on scrap metal 
prices. These prices are likely to reflect the true resale value obtained by criminals in the case of 
metal theft. We collected the data from letsrecycle.com, a trade industry media outlet that services 
the waste management and recycling sector. They maintain a historical archive of detailed, 
monthly scrap metal prices across many types of metal.  This allows us to match scrap metal 
prices to the MPS metal crimes. As well as these local, UK-focused scrap metal prices, we are 
also able to draw on international commodity markets for price information. We obtain 
that cannot be easily concorded over time (we found that this was most common in the electronics, furnishing and 
building materials 1-digit categories).   
17
 Because of the available sample sizes by stolen product we consider three adjacent years to construct these 
measures for 2002 (pooling 2001-3) and 2012 (pooling 2011-13). This means in our statistical analysis below we 
cannot feasibly set up an annual panel and therefore look at long changes between 2002 and 2012. 
18
 Specifically, the seven metals are gold, silver, copper, lead, aluminium, brass and a residual group of other metals. 
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international metal commodity prices from the online platform “Index Mundi”. All prices are 
collected at the monthly frequency and are measured in pounds sterling. 
Initial Descriptive Analysis 
Figure 2 shows trends in the total number of crimes and metal crimes in our MPS data.  It 
shows a sharp fall in crime across all groups, with the aggregate of burglaries, thefts and robberies 
(the left axis) falling from just under 50000 in January 2002 to just over 30000 by December 
2012, or a 35 percent fall. The metal crimes (right axis) fluctuate quite a lot but more than double 
over the 2002-12 time period. 
In Table 1 we report some descriptive statistics on the changing composition of thefts by 
property type as observed in our balanced panel of 44 goods categories. In particular, we look at 
the change in shares of total thefts per two-digit product and report figures for the top 10 and 
bottom products over the 2002-2012 period. This indicates some obvious movements that are 
consistent with changing prices driving crime trends. The fastest growing categories are 
dominated by either high-tech, high-value electronic goods (mobile phones, power tools) and 
jewellery-related goods. The products with declining shares are goods where there has been strong 
downward pressure on prices, such as the case of Audio Players discussed in our introduction. 
Figure 3 then shows a scatterplot of average 12-month changes in the log of the crime 
count and the log of the price index for the 44 product panel and for the 21 stolen items from 
BCS. The plots show the between-good variation across categories in the data, abstracting from 
within-good changes over time. The averaged changes are clearly related as the positively sloped 
(and statistically significant) regression line fit through the points in both charts shows. The charts 
very clearly reveal that products with bigger price increases – like the jewellery categories (Rings, 
Necklace and Watch) and goods such as Bicycles – saw relative crime increases. On the other 
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hand those experiencing price falls – most notably the big price decreases for Audio Players – saw 
crime fall the most. 
The other point of note is the strong similarity between the two charts. They are based on 
very different data on crime and prices/values, yet both show a strong correlation between 
changes in crime and changes in the potential values of goods. Study of the two charts reveals 
that, for the most part, the same goods line up well. Closer inspection reveals one difference that 
is pertinent, namely that the Mobile Phones category is close to the regression line in the BCS 
chart, but is somewhat to the left in the MPS 44 product plot. We think this probably reflects that 
higher price mobiles are more likely to be stolen and this is not picked up in the overall average 
price index, but it would be better reflected when crime victims report replacement costs in the 
BCS. This apart, however, the main picture is one of striking similarity between the two charts. 
4. Empirical Models of Crime and Prices
The descriptive analysis of the previous section is highly suggestive of an empirical connection 
between changes in crime and changes in prices. In this section, we set out a modelling approach 
which subjects this initial finding to a more stringent statistical evaluation, including discussion of 
a number of threats that may be posed to the identification of a positive crime-price elasticity. 
Baseline Empirical Models – Consumer Goods Panel 
A monthly panel data log-log specification to estimate crime-price elasticities can be 
expressed for goods category g in month-year period t (t = my, where m is month and y is year) as: 
() 	= 	 		+ 	() 		+ 	 	+	 +	    (11)
where C is the number of crimes (that is, a count of items stolen) and P is the price index for each 
good (calculated relative to the base level observed at the beginning of the sample in January 
18 
2002).    is a product-specific fixed effect and to control for common seasonal and annual
effects we first include month and year dummies that are denoted by  and  respectively, with
 representing the error term. The inclusion of the product, month and year fixed effects ensures
that the estimated elasticity β is the within-product elasticity that is identified from changes 
through time of crime and prices. 
We adopt this within-groups specification as we have a long T panel of 132 observations 
(12 months by 11 years) for our 44 matched crime-price groups.  More stringent empirical models 
can also be estimated and we generalise the estimating equation in several ways. First the fact that 
we have monthly data over multiple years means we can allow for a full set of time effects by 
including all month-by-year dummies, τt.
We can also generalise further to allow month effects to vary by good g and therefore 
make the pattern of seasonality fully flexible at the goods level. Incorporating both of these 
produces the following specification: 
() 	= 	 		+ 	() 		+  	+ 	    (12)
where   (or  ) describes every month-year combination and  is a fixed effect for each
product-month cell. This seasonally adjusted, within-groups model forms our preferred 
specification as it incorporates a full set of time effects and conditions out goods-specific 
seasonality. 
Issues 
These estimating equations capture a number of salient features of the crime-price 
relationship as described in the simple model of Section 2 and will enable us to subject our initial 
descriptive findings to a more rigorous evaluation. But, before we consider the estimates that 
emerge, a number of issues require some discussion. 
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A first feature to note in terms of the model is that since outside wages (W) and sanctions 
(S) do not vary across goods then their effects are absorbed into the empirical model’s time 
effects. Note that in the case of sanctions there is a limited sentencing gradient according to the 
value of thefts in the UK.19 Secondly, any constant differences in the specific success probability
associated with each good (denoted as (1 −	) in the model) will be absorbed into the goods-
specific fixed effect αg. We can realistically expect this success probability – which can also be 
interpreted as a general difficulty to steal – as varying across goods according to factors such as: 
the typical pattern of security or protection afforded to each good; the usual location or placement 
of the good; the available stock of the good held by consumers; and physical characteristics such 
as weight and size which will bear on the physical practicality of stealing the good. 
The product fixed effects αg also play role when considering measurement issues that 
might arise with respect to our price data. The preferred measure of  outlined in the model would
be re-sale value, that is, the amount of money a criminal can obtain for a stolen good. The price 
we use (retail prices as given by the ONS) is obviously an imperfect proxy for this. The fraction 
of analogous retail value that a criminal can recoup for a good will depend on a range of factors 
such as: traceability, the size of potential resale markets, and product durability. However, if we 
think of the relationship between retail prices and re-sale value as following a simple linear 
markdown function, such as 	 =	(1 −  ) , then this makes the re-sale price faced
by criminals some constant fraction 1 −  of the retail price we measure. If this markdown is
19
 The UK’s Sentencing Guidelines for theft provide scope for sentences to vary with the value of theft being 
considered (Sentencing Council 2014).  These guidelines set out a sentencing grid based on the two dimensions of 
“harm” and “culpability”, with the value of thefts helping to determine the level of harm. The grid lists three harm 
categories based on value bands of: £125-£250; £250-£1000; and over £1000. These bands and associated sentences 
are changed infrequently and can therefore be treated as fixed for the purposes of the monthly analysis presented in 
this paper. Changes in the value of goods over time may push the expected sanction into a higher sentencing band, but 
this is unlikely to be a common enough experience for it to affect our estimated elasticities. Hence we treat sanctions 
as being fixed and homogenous across goods.   
20 
stable over time then it will be differenced out by the product fixed effects in all of the 
specifications outlined above. As a result, our within groups estimate using retail prices will 
capture the underlying changes in re-sale value that drive the crime participation decision. 
This assumption that non-price heterogeneity is constant or only slowly changing through 
time does have implications for the interpretation of our estimated  parameter for prices. If we
think that non-price factors such as the success probability (1 −	) or the re-sale depreciation
factor λ could vary at the same frequency as the price effects then this could be a source of
omitted variable bias. That is, our measured price changes could also be picking up correlated 
effects related to unmeasured changes in success probabilities or the state of the resale market. It 
is therefore important to establish the time profile of the price effects in order to judge whether 
these effects could be plausibly conflated with goods-specific omitted variables in this way. 
Dynamic Specifications - Consumer Goods Panel 
It is straightforward to extend the above empirical model to incorporate dynamics. Firstly, 
a lagged dependent variable can, following the usual logic, be included to account for persistence 
and as a proxy for additional omitted factors that could be correlated with crime: 
() 	=   	+ 			() 		+ 	!(("#)) 	+ 	  +       (13)
In this dynamic setup, the long-run crime-price elasticity is 	 [1	 − 	!]⁄ . 20 Dynamics can also be
introduced in terms of extra lags in prices, to allow for the possible adjustment of crime to price 
shocks over several prior periods, as follows: 
() 	= 	 	+ 			() 	+ ∑ ()*,(")),-).# 	+ 	 	+ 		 (14) 
where /	denotes the order of the lag in prices (from a one month lag to a maximum lag of K).
20
 The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable is typically subject to caveats regarding Nickell (1981) bias but in our 
case this is mitigated by the long-T structure of our panel. 
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The specification in (14) is helpful for validating the argument presented above regarding 
the potential influence of changing patterns of non-price heterogeneity across goods. That is, the 
observed pattern of price effects imposes a required structure for the potential non-price factors 
discussed above.  Specifically, for such non-price factors to play a role as omitted variables they 
need to operate at the same frequency or speed as the price effects. Practically, this means that the 
faster is the observed adjustment of crime to price shocks, the narrower is the channel for the non-
price effects to play a confounding role. We return to this discussion of confounders in the results 
section where we also discuss other sources of time-varying confounders, in particular the biases 
that could result from endogenous reporting behaviour by victims of crime. 
Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach 
While the above framework for the consumer goods panel can deal with a large range of 
possible omitted confounders, we also extend our research design to deal with the potential 
influence of good-specific demand shocks over time. By this we mean unmeasured demand 
shocks that could increase both the price and the public holdings of a good at the same time, with 
the converse case (lower prices and reduced holdings) also applying. 
As an example, consider recently popular goods such as smart phones or bicycles. Prices 
for these goods have increased but so have public holdings, with widespread adoption of new 
smart phones and greater usage of bicycles. The increased stock of a good in the population will 
increase the opportunities for theft and this could bias the measured effects of prices upwards. In 
principle, this demand shocks problem is still subject to our argument about dynamics above, 
namely that the rapid adjustment of crime to prices will impose a tight structure on any series of 
confounding shocks. That is, while the price of bicycles or mobile phones changes on a month-to-
month basis it is hard to envisage perfectly matching shifts in the local availability of bikes or 
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phones. As a case in point, the within-good variation for mobile phones and bicycles is very 
strong with correlations between prices and crime of 0.62 and 0.45 respectively. We show the plot 
of the 12-month differences for these goods in Figure A1 and the period-to-period tracking is 
clearly apparent. However, the concern about unspecified sources of bias still applies, so to 
address this we consider a group of commodity-related goods where the source of the demand 
shocks shifting around prices is external to local holdings of the good and can be clearly pinned 
down. 
Specifically, our strategy is to instrument the local prices for jewellery, fuel and metals 
with their related prices in world commodity markets. In the case of jewellery the related world 
price is gold and for fuel we use the oil price. We map metals directly to their associated world 
commodity prices. For metals we also have directly measured local UK scrap metal prices, which 
ameliorate concerns of using retail price indexes for new goods as a measure of the resale value 
that could be recouped by the criminal.21
Practically, our approach can be interpreted as a quasi-experiment such that prices change 
exogenously due to demand shocks in international markets (consider the very clear example of 
rapidly rising copper prices related to recent economic growth in China) while local stocks of 
these goods are fixed in the short-run. In addition, these commodity-related goods are effectively 
homogenous and constant in the quality over time. Indeed, this is part of their appeal to criminals 
– metals in particular can be melted down so that they are untraceable and more easily traded. In
terms of our quasi-experiment, this homogeneity shuts down the type of unobservable changes in 
product quality that are a potential source of confounding shocks when considering electronics or 
other relatively sophisticated types of consumer goods. 
21 So in the context of the resale price markdown function introduced earlier as 	 =	 (1 − 	) we can
think of the markdown λ as very close to zero since criminals do get the spot price by selling to scrap metal dealers. 
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The empirical specifications we use are analogous to those for the consumer goods panel 
but we focus on specific time series models observing crime and prices. In the single good time 
series models we deal with the seasonality of crime issue discussed above in the context of the 
panel by estimating 12-month differenced models (we denote the differencing by the 12-month 
difference operator, ∆12). Thus if we denote the world commodity price by WP, the two reduced 
forms in seasonal differences with time effects modelled by a time trend are: 
012() 	= 	 !# 	+ 	2#012(3) 	+ 		4#		 + 	5#
(15) 
012() 	= 	 !6 	+ 	26012(3) 	+ 		46		 + 	56
which can be combined to give a structural form as: 
012() 	= 	 !7 	+ 	27012() 	+		47		 + 	57 (16)
where the instrumental variable (IV) estimate of the crime-price elasticity is the ratio of the 
reduced form coefficients, where  θ3 = θ1/ θ2. 
5. Results – Consumer Goods Panel
Baseline Models – Consumer Goods Panel 
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 2 report the results of estimating crime-price elasticities from 
the balanced panel of 44 consumer goods products. The three specifications produce a robust, 
statistically significant elasticity of crime with respect to prices. The estimate does not vary much 
across the three specifications, which differ in the way they model the common time effects, and 
is estimated to be about 0.35. This suggests that a 10 percent increase in the (relative) price of a 
good is associated with a 3.5 percent increase in crime. From these baseline models, it seems that 
crime is sensitive to prices in the way the economic incentives model of crime predicts. 
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The remainder of the Table takes the column (3) seasonally adjusted estimates and 
generalises them in different directions.  Firstly, the model is estimated for different crime types – 
respectively theft and (burglary+robbery) – in the specifications reported in columns (4) and (5).22 
The elasticity is a little higher for thefts, at 0.413 compared to 0.254 for (burglary+robbery), but 
both are significant and positive showing important price sensitivities, and we are not able to 
formally reject the null hypothesis that they are equal to one another. For the rest of the analysis 
we therefore consider all crimes. 
It is well known that crime is highly persistent and so we allow for this via inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable in specification (6) reported in Table 2. The estimates do indeed reveal 
this persistence, as the coefficient on the lag is strongly significant even in the presence of the 
seasonal differencing within goods. However, the short run crime-price elasticity remains 
significant and positive at 0.106, and translates into a long run elasticity of 0.34 (= 0.106 / [1-
0.692]). Thus the estimates are robust to crime dynamics. Put a different way, inclusion of the 
detailed product by month and year by month fixed effects has already netted out a large part of 
the possible influence of crime persistence on the estimated elasticity.23
Figure 4 shows the full set of plots for individual goods elasticities where we have 
estimated separate elasticities at the 1-digit level. All are positive and significant price elasticities 
are apparent across a wide range (the majority) of categories. But there is some evidence of 
heterogeneity as a subset of goods are seen to be highly price sensitive with estimates of 
elasticities just above unity. 
22
 We aggregate burglary and robbery since the number of robberies is relatively small, representing 6 percent of total 
items stolen. 
23
 In a further robustness check, we re-estimated the 44-good model as 12-month differences, rather than the 
seasonally adjusted within-groups model. The estimated elasticity remains strongly significant and positive, although 
falls a little to an estimate and associated standard error of 0.194 (0.042). 
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Price Dynamics – Consumer Goods Panel 
Given the structure of the models we have estimated, concern about bias in the elasticities 
would need to arise from time-varying unobservables that drive both crime and prices over and 
above the seasonal adjustment we have made. As discussed, one way to assess this is to examine 
the lag structure of the price effects as a means of gauging the time window for which time-
varying observables may play a role. Briefly put, the speed of the short-run adjustment between 
crime and prices determines the structure that any time-varying unobservables would need to 
follow to impart a systematic bias. This is where the monthly data that we use delivers important 
information. In principle, a lower frequency of observations on prices and crime (for example, 
annual data) is compatible with a wide set of gradual adjustment responses by potential victims, 
producers of goods or police. However, it is much more demanding to expect these confounding 
adjustment processes to be operating strongly at the monthly frequency. 
In Table 3 we show estimates of the lag structure of prices in our seasonally adjusted 
within-groups model. The specifications gradually build up, first entering the price variable dated 
t only, then t and (t-1), up to a model including all price terms dated t to (t-3). Looking at columns 
(1)-(4) for all crimes, the picture that emerges is of some price dynamics, but around half of the 
effect is contemporaneous, and that adjustment is rapid. Moreover, the long run elasticity in the 
models remains at 0.35 and strongly significant. 
The overall implication of this observed lag structure is that any confounding time-varying 
unobservable would need to follow a very sharp, short-run pattern to account for the price effect 
we measure in our main specifications. Furthermore, to follow prices so closely these unobserved 
effects would need to have at least some mechanical link to prices. The obvious channel here 
would be through some reaction function related to investments in security and the protection of 
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goods from theft. But note here that an increase in the value of a good is actually an incentive for 
individual goods owners to invest in security – any such investments would attenuate the effect of 
price and impart a downward bias to our estimates. The same argument applies for police 
campaigns related to the thefts of particular goods (for example, mobile phones or jewellery). 
These campaigns are designed to reduce crime and would therefore also attenuate any price-
related effects on crime. In addition to the measurement error that arises from using retail rather 
than direct resale prices, this suggests that our estimates of the crime-price elasticity are most 
likely biased downwards. 
However, one plausible source of an upward bias is endogenous reporting behaviour by 
victims – as prices rise and goods become more valuable then victims of crime are more likely to 
report the incident. Since our MPS data is based on reported crime this source of bias is relevant. 
We therefore turn to the British Crime Survey data that contains information on reported and non-
reported thefts to determine some bounds for the potential influence of endogenous reporting on 
the crime-price relationship. 
British Crime Survey 
We have put together data on the number of stolen items and their value for 2002 and 2012 
from BCS reported victimizations. This data allows us to both study the sensitivity of crime 
reporting to the value of stolen items as well as provide estimates of the basic crime-price 
relationship using an alternative data source. 
In terms of reporting behaviour, aggregate statistics between 2002 and 2012 for the numbers 
of police recorded crime and victim reports based on the aggregate BCS is shown in Figure 5. The 
Figure shows that the relationship between reported and non-reported crime to be steady over the 
2002 to 2012 period.  However, this could conceal compositional shifts in reporting patterns by type 
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of stolen item – goods that have become more expensive could have increased in their reporting 
rates while goods whose value has fallen may have experienced reduced reporting. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows results from studying the relationship between reporting rates and 
the average value for the two period panel (2002 and 2012) of 21 goods. Column (1) reports a 
modest relationship between reporting rates and value in levels with a 10 per cent higher value 
being associated with a 1.2 per cent higher reporting rate. However, the within-groups estimates in 
column (2) show the relationship to be weaker in changes, so that victim reporting is less sensitive 
to shifts in value over time. Thus, in terms of within-group evolutions through time, there has been 
little change in the reporting probability as a function of changing prices. 
Estimates of crime-price elasticities from a within-groups specification for BCS data are 
given in the final two columns of Table 4. They show a remarkably consistent pattern with the 
baseline results from the consumer goods panel. Two specifications are reported, column (3) shows 
results from victimizations reported to the police and column (4) from all reported victimizations. 
The former are consistent with the MPS data and comprise about half of all BCS victimizations. 
Those not reported are mostly much less significant, minor crimes. The estimated crime-price 
elasticity is significant and positive in both cases, and is estimated to be 0.42 in column (3) and 0.52 
in column (4). These (especially the 0.42 from the reported crimes) are close in magnitude to the 
0.35 from the consumer panel and we view this as strong corroboration of our core findings. 
6. Results – Commodity and Metal Crimes
Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates 
The results presented in our analysis of the consumer goods panel give us confidence that 
a robust and strong relationship exists between goods prices and crime. Furthermore, the 
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relationship is close enough in the short run that it is hard to reconcile the observed correlation 
with potential confounding effects associated with such factors as investments in security, 
movements in the resale/retail mark-up or endogenous reporting behaviour by theft victims. 
However, as has already been noted, a remaining issue is the potential influence of demand 
shocks pushing prices and local public holdings of goods up (or down) at the same time. 
Sophisticated consumer goods such as electronics are particularly susceptible to this problem 
since they are subject to sometimes rapid changes in quality that are correlated with changing 
consumer demand patterns. 
To rule this kind of behaviour out, we set up a quasi-experimental design where price 
movements in international commodity markets shift the corresponding domestic UK prices of a 
subset of related goods. Hence the changes in price we identify through this approach are not 
related to changes in local factors such as availability that could be simultaneously affecting the 
expected benefit of stealing a good. Also, these goods we consider are homogenous in their 
quality over time thereby shutting down this particular source of confounding demand shocks. 
 The descriptive statistics for our commodity and metal goods are shown in Table 5. The 
upper panel of the Table shows numbers for jewellery and fuel, also comparing their changes over 
time with the overall crime and price growth from the consumer goods panel. The lower panel 
shows numbers on all metal crimes and on copper crimes. The jewellery category is the count of 
thefts pooled across the 2-digit jewellery categories that appear in our 44-good consumer goods 
panel which typically feature a high level of gold content.24 Since fuel is only reported as a
separate crime category by the MPS from 2005 onwards we report means for this good across 96 
months rather than the 132 months observed for all other goods.  The numbers in the Table show 
24
 These 2-digit categories (with MPS property type codes in parentheses – see the Appendix) are: Necklace/Pendant 
(JA), Ring (JB), Bracelet/Bangle (JD) and Earrings (JE). 
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that the number of jewellery crimes was fairly constant over time changing by -0.5 percent per 
year, but that this is a relative rise compared to the -3.5 percent annual fall in all crimes. At the 
same time, the jewellery price and the world gold price grew significantly. Fuel crimes grew 
rapidly at over 20 percent a year and the associated prices also significantly rose. 
Turning to the metal crimes in the lower panel of the Table, we see significant increases 
over time in both crime and prices. All metal crimes rose by 11 percent a year between 2002 and 
2012.  Copper crimes grew by an extraordinary 29 percent per year, while both the scrap metal 
price and the world prices rose sharply. For all metals, the average scrap metal price from the 
letsrecycle.com data rose by 12 percent a year and the copper scrap price by 15 percent a year. 
The world prices (a composite for all metals from Index Mundi and the world copper price) 
showed similarly strong rises. 
Plots over time of local and world prices are shown in Figure 6 for jewellery and fuel and 
in Figure 7 for all metals and copper make the nature of the price increases clear across goods. 
The general commodity boom of the mid-2000s has been reckoned as the biggest in 50 years (see 
Abbot, 2009, Bennett, 2008, and The Economist, 2009). In term of metals commodities, the 
specialist historical evidence indicates there is a high spread of common versus commodity-
specific sources of variance across different industrial and precious metals (see Bidarkota and 
Crucini, 2000, or Chen, 2010). There were large level shifts in metal and copper prices in the mid-
2000s and prices were sustained at a high level as demand for many types of metal from countries 
like China and India continued. Gold prices experienced a well-known trend increase and drifted 
upwards with some sharp fluctuations over the 2002-2012 period. 
However, the most important feature of these plots for our research design is the tight 
relationship between local and global prices. The plots for jewellery and fuel prices in Figure 6 
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are expressed in terms of indexed values and show a general pattern of strong co-movement with 
some asymmetries in timing and, in the case of the jewellery-gold price relationship, a difference 
in trend growth rates. The 12-month seasonal difference plots also shown in Figure 6 show a very 
tight tracking between local and world prices, with a correlation of 0.49 for jewellery/gold and 
0.77 for fuel/oil. 
For the metals commodities (shown in Figure 7) we have direct information on the levels 
of scrap metal and world prices. Statistically, the price transmission between world and local 
scrap metal prices is very rapid, with adjustment occurring either contemporaneously or within the 
first few lagged periods. We show some formal evidence on this in Appendix Table A3, which 
models scrap prices in terms of contemporaneous and 1-period lagged effects, indicating that the 
majority of pass-through occurs in the current period. Institutionally, this tight relationship 
between scrap and world prices is due to the structure of the scrap metal industry. The Home 
Office records 3,600 permitted scrap metal dealers in the UK (circa 2011) and describes a 
pyramid structure for the industry whereby scrap is moved between dealers until it becomes 
concentrated among a small sub-group of dealers who are better equipped to process and refine 
the scrap (Home Office, 2012). At this point a large amount of processed material is actually 
exported, accounting for the tight integration of local scrap and international metal prices.25 
Given this background of strong local and world price correlations, we can now turn to the 
statistical relationship between crime and prices for our commodity-related goods. Figure 8 shows 
the plot of 12-month differences for Jewellery and Fuel price indices against their analogous 
crime series, with correlations of 0.27 and 0.53 respectively. 
25
 The Home Office reported that 430,000 tonnes of copper was exported to China from the UK in July 2011. See 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bills-acts/legal-aid-sentencing/laspo-metal-theft-ia.pdf. 
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Statistical estimates are presented in Table 6. The Tables shows two sets of estimates of 
four seasonally-differenced specifications, namely the OLS estimates, the crime and price reduced 
forms where the instrument is the world price and the IV estimates. The two sets differ in that 
columns (1)-(4) are the basic seasonally differenced estimates and columns (5)-(8) additionally 
include a linear trend to capture macro effects. 
Considering  the Panel A results for jewellery first, it is clear that there is a significant and 
positive crime-price elasticity of 0.56 in column (1) but also that (as the above charts show) there 
are differential trends in crime and prices that render this insignificant if a trend is included (in 
column (5)). However, the reduced form crime and price regressions (in columns (2) and (3) 
without a trend and in columns (6) and (7) with a trend) turn out to be strong. They show a 
significant and positive connection between crime and world prices and between UK prices and 
world prices. The latter first stage regression has high F-statistics. Thus the IV estimates in the 
trend free and trend included estimates uncover a strong and significant jewellery-crime price 
elasticity that exceeds unity (in column (4) of 1.25 and in column (8) of 1.48). 
We also find significant crime-price elasticities for fuel as the regression estimates 
reported in Panel B of Table 6 show. The OLS estimates are much the same irrespective of  the 
inclusion of the trend at 0.70 in column (1) and 0.71 in column (5).  As with jewellery, the two 
reduced forms also uncover significant positive crime-world price and UK price-world price 
relationships, and again the first-stage F statistics are very significant. The IV estimates turn out to 
be a little lower than the OLS estimates, and are between 0.63 and 0.66, thus showing there to be 
a sizable fuel crime-price elasticity. 
We conduct a similar analysis for metal commodities with the plots of crime against the 
associated change in scrap metal price shown in Figure 9. For all metals and for copper, the price 
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and crime series track each other well, with some jumps in places, and are highly correlated. 
Table 7 shows the statistical estimates of the crime-price elasticities for all metals and for copper, 
The OLS estimates show metal crime to be highly elastic to price, with point estimates of 1.35-
1.43 for all metals and 1.66-1.70 for copper being comparable to the upper range of goods studied 
in the consumer goods panel. Consistent with the rapid and high level of price transmission 
evident in the Figure 7 plots, the first stages shown in columns (3) and (7) are extremely strong 
with very high F-statistics. In the specifications including the trend (column (8)) the IV crime-
price elasticity is estimated at 1.49 for all metal crimes and even higher at 1.81 for copper.26 Thus
metal crimes are very highly price sensitive. 
As discussed, the commodity-related sub-group of goods, especially the metals, provides a 
striking setting for studying the response of crime to a series of exogenous price shocks with the 
quality of goods relatively fixed over time. We therefore see this as the cleanest evidence 
available on the responsiveness of criminals to changes in price with minimal changes in other 
factors that could determine the expected benefit of theft. 
One concern could be that the metal elasticities that we estimate are dominated by 
variation associated with the large jumps in prices that occurred in the first half of the sample, 
particularly in 2005-2007 when the prices of all metals and copper increased by their largest 
amounts. Consider the case of copper, where the upward price movements were especially 
pronounced.  It is plausible that such a sharp increase in returns could have induced a rush into so-
26
 We have also estimated crime-price elasticities for lead and aluminium crimes. For lead (for example, as in the case 
of “lifted from the roof of a Holy Named church”), we had to confine ourselves to the looking at data only for the 
second half of our sample period (i.e. from July 2007 onwards) as separate numbers were not well recorded prior to 
that. Aluminium crimes only comprise a relatively small share and so the time series is quite noisy at the monthly 
time series frequency. Nonetheless, we uncovered similarly high magnitude IV elasticities for both lead and 
aluminium (using world lead and aluminium prices to instrument scrap prices). The IV elasticity estimate from a 
trends seasonally differenced specification comparable to column (8) of Table 7 for lead was 2.2 and for aluminium 
was 1.6. We report the full estimates in the Appendix in Table A2 with associated plots comparable to Figures 7 and 
9 in Figures A2 and A3. 
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called ‘red gold rush’ (i.e. copper) as criminals sought to pick off low hanging fruit in terms of the 
least secure metal goods. On the other side of the market, the sharp increase in the value of metal 
may have boosted the reporting rate of metal crimes. The available evidence on metal crime 
indicates that there is a limited margin of effect for reporting to change in this context. Since most 
metal crime is focused on infrastructure and commercial businesses, reporting propensities are 
very high to the point of being automatic. For example, we estimate that 45-60 percent of metal 
crimes are infrastructure-related in our sample27 with the remainder comprised of commercial
businesses, where reporting rates are typically high.28
However, as a robustness check against the ‘gold rush’ effects we conducted an exercise 
based on recursive, period-by-period estimation of elasticities for all metal crimes and copper. 
This is designed to pick up the extent to which responses to the price booms of 2005-2007 may 
have pushed up the average elasticity. We begin by running the IV model for metal crimes and 
scrap metal prices (i.e. the specification used in column (8) of Table 7) on the last fifty periods of 
the sample (October 2008 to December 2012). This reflects the sub-period by which the initial set 
of major prices rises have settled in, giving elasticities that are based on variations around a stable 
mean and consolidated levels of security amongst owners of metal assets. We then iteratively 
extend the sample one month at a time, incorporating observations before 2008 until we reach the 
T = 120 (seasonally differenced) full sample by going back as far as January 2003. This allows us 
to see the influence on the crime-price elasticity of incorporating the potential ‘gold rush’ 
27
 The MPS only began explicitly coding up metal crimes as infrastructure or non-infrastructure related in April 2012. 
Over this period, the share of infrastructure related crimes for metals fluctuates between 45-60 percent. In terms of 
general statistics, the ONS (2014) reports that 48.7 percent of all metal theft in England and Wales for 2012-13 was 
infrastructure related, defined as the removal of metals that have an impact of the functioning of live services such as 
railways and utilities. The remaining 51.3 percent of non-infrastructure related thefts still contains a large quantity of 
public sector and business targets (for example, factories, metal gates, and memorial plaques) that have similar 
characteristics to infrastructure but do not necessarily have their basic functions threatened by the metal theft.  
28
 For example, the UK Commercial Victimization Survey (CVS) (a survey that measures crimes against business 
establishments) indicates that reporting rates to police are over 80 percent for burglary and major categories of theft.  
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observations between 2005 and 2007. The coefficient and confidence interval plots shown in 
Figure 10 do not reveal any explosive sensitivity to the inclusion of each sub-period – in all cases 
we see precisely estimated elasticities for each sample period considered. In the case of copper it 
is evident that the inclusion of the earlier period boosts the measured elasticity a little as more 
observations in the 2005-2007 period are included, but the most conservative estimate is still high 
at approximately 1.4.29
In summary, in both cases (all metals and copper) we do not detect evidence that suggests 
the estimates are affected by either explosive ‘gold rush’ effects biasing the elasticities upwards or 
strong adaptation effects as potential victims change their behaviour. Note also here that strong 
adaptation effects (that is investments in security by victims that would make metal harder to 
steal) would be a force that would make crime less sensitive to prices and in practice this would 
drive down the measured elasticities. Together with there being minimal product quality changes 
in the case of the metals commodities, this reinforces the relevance of these estimates as the 
cleanest example of the response of criminals to changes in the returns to criminal opportunities. 
7. Discussion
The finding of significant crime-price elasticities fits well with the basic tenets of the economic 
model of crime where the decisions of individuals contemplating engaging in criminal activity are 
shaped by economic incentives. In particular, evidence of price responsiveness sheds light on one 
route whereby the returns to crime emphasised in the standard Becker/Ehrlich model may work. If 
the value of loot changes, because it becomes more or less attractive to potential criminals as its 
price changes, then it alters the relative return to crime available for stealing different goods. 
29
 The recursive elasticities in Figure 10 are from estimates using the IV metal crime / scrap price specification from 
column (8) of Table 7. 
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Thus, crime may rise if prices rise (and vice versa). Also, the mix of crimes done by 
criminals may then be shaped by price variations. If this mix changes through time then it is also 
possible that crime trends may be affected by price changes. For example, witness the very 
significant upsurge in metal crimes that we have shown occurred at the same time as the price of 
metals were exogenously driven up by world markets. 
A question that follows is whether changing prices are a factor in explaining crime trends. 
The issue of falling crime rates across countries since the early 1990s has become a frequent topic 
of discussion (e.g. Blumstein and Wallman, 2005, or Levitt, 2004, for the US crime drop and 
Buonanno et al., 2011, for Europe’s property crime fall). Various hypotheses have been proposed, 
and many ruled out. Prices, and the change in the composition of crime that price changes 
generate, have to our knowledge not yet been considered in these discussions. 
Whether there is a contribution of changing prices to crime trends is interesting if (as we 
find) there is evidence of a positive crime-price elasticity. This could mean that part of any crime 
drop could be explained by a falling real value of goods that were traditionally stolen by 
criminals. Furthermore, since the structure of consumer prices is highly correlated across 
countries, prices are a plausible common factor that could help to explain falls in property crime 
rates internationally. In contrast, other more frequently mentioned determinants of crime, such as 
labour market conditions, sanctions and policing, fluctuate differentially across countries and as 
such are less plausible candidates to explain the global crime trends. 
We have constructed an empirical counterfactual exercise to look at this in a very simple 
way. Over our period of study, total crime falls by 3.5 percent per year between 2002 and 2012 
(see Figure 2 and Table 5 above). Since our empirical analysis detects evidence of a significant 
crime-price elasticity, we can undertake a counterfactual exercise to ask what the crime fall would 
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have been had the relative structure of prices stayed the same in real terms. We do this in practice 
in a simple, mechanical manner by considering price growth for the goods in our consumer panel 
as compared to overall price growth. 
The average price of the stolen items in our 44-goods panel rose by 1.4 percent per year on 
average between 2002 and 2012. The overall CPI rose by 2.9 percent per year over the same time 
period, so that in real terms the value of the goods stolen by criminals had been falling (by 1.5 
percent a year). One can ask how this fall in real terms could map into reduced crime rates by 
noting that the real price decline when multiplied by our elasticity of 0.35 predicts a 0.53 percent 
a year fall in crime, or 15 percent of the overall crime drop. 
If instead of comparing to prices of all goods, we benchmark the 1.4 percent a year 
average price rise to the 2.7 percent a year growth in average wages in London (the legal 
alternative) between 2002 and 2012, we come up with a prediction of 13 percent of the overall 
crime drop.30 Benchmarking to growth in the London 10th percentile weekly wage - since one
might think the 10th percentile weekly wage is a more appropriate comparison for individuals on
the margins of crime - predicts a slightly bigger 0.81 percent a year fall, or 23 percent of the 
overall crime drop. 31
In terms of magnitudes we view this as a sizable contribution given that crime is shaped by 
a whole range of factors, of which the changing value of loot is one. In this context of multiple 
factors shaping crime trends see, for example, Levitt’s (2004) account of ten possible factors that 
could account for the US crime fall, of which he argues four matter and six do not.  Interestingly, 
changing prices, or the changing value of stolen goods more generally, not being one of the ten 
30
 Average weekly wages in London rose from £550 in 2002 to £697 in 2012 (based on Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings data). 
31
 The bigger contribution is because the 10th percentile actually rose by a little more than average (probably because 
the minimum wage kept its value better than the average in the downturn and Great Recession period) going from 
£124 a week in 2002 to £169 in 2012, or up by 3.6 percent a year.  
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candidate explanations remains an understudied, if not an entirely missing, feature of research on 
the crime drop.  
The estimated contribution to falling crime could form a lower bound for two reasons, 
crime specialization and revenues from crime. First, crime specialization due to adjustment costs 
might not allow criminals to adapt to changing prices and switch easily from DVD burglars to 
mobile phone pickpockets, as construction workers cannot simply shift to nurses, even if market 
opportunities are better for the latter in both cases. Though some goods have become more 
attractive, we might still observe some criminals specialising on the less attractive ones, due to 
their product-specific crime skills. Second, if potential criminals do substitute into more lucrative 
alternatives as relative prices change, then they may do less crime as the returns rise (in parallel 
discussion to the labour supply literature, crime participation would be lower if the income effect 
dominates). This means that the well-documented drop in crime refers to the quantity and not the 
total revenue (quantity X prices) from crime, which might relate more to the societal costs 
associated with crime, as prices are missing from most of the existing studies. 
So far we have considered the magnitudes of crime responses on average. For some goods, 
however, the observed price falls have been very sizable. The example we highlighted at the start 
of the paper was the very rapidly falling real price of audio-visual goods. Between 2002 and 2012 
their nominal price fell by a huge 9 percent per year on average, as compared to the average price 
rise of 1.4 per year in the consumer goods panel, and the overall CPI rising by an average 2.9 
percent per year. Asking whether the real price fall (of 11.9 = 9.0 + 2.9 percent a year) for this 
particular group contributed to falling crime produces a more definitive answer – conducting the 
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counterfactual exercise for audio-visual goods reveals that 38 percent of the crime drop of 8 
percent a year is attributable to lower prices.32 
Finally, consider the case of metals, where we saw the rapid price increases and the very 
sharp upsurge in metal crime and where we estimated a strong sensitivity of crime to price 
changes. Price growth for all metals was an annual 12 percent (see Table 5), or 9.1 percent above 
CPI inflation. Multiplied by the estimated IV elasticity of 1.49 this predicts a metal crime increase 
of 13.5 percent a year, and so accounts for all of the actual rise of 11.1 percent a year.  For copper, 
a real price increase of 12.4 percent a year combined with the estimated elasticity of 1.81 predicts 
a 22.4 percent a year increase, or 76 percent of the 29.3 percent a year increase in copper crimes.   
 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study how changes in the prices of goods that criminals may steal affect criminal 
behaviour. We consider this to offer a direct test of whether shifts in economic incentives, 
working through movements in returns to crime driven by price changes, impact on crime. We 
estimate significant crime-price elasticities from rich administrative data on what was stolen in 
burglaries, thefts and robberies that took place in London between January 2002 and December 
2012. 
 We obtain price elasticities for two sets of goods, the former a consumer panel of 44 stolen 
goods categories that we match to price data over time, the latter for metal and commodity related 
goods where we have scrap metal prices and can consider prices being set by world commodity 
markets. The average estimated elasticity in the consumer panel is 0.35, suggesting a 10 percent 
increase in prices raises crime by a just over a third. We view this as a lower bound, for a number 
                                                 
32
 This comes from multiplying the 11.9 percent real price drop by the good-specific elasticity of 0.248, which 
predicts a crime fall of 3.0 percent a year (or 38 percent of the total crime fall of 8 percent a year). 
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of reasons we discuss in the main body of the paper. But even at this level as the average price 
increase for these goods has not risen by as much as overall price inflation, thus showing a real 
fall, we find that this explains around 20 percent of the aggregate fall in burglaries, thefts and 
robberies seen in our data. The metal and commodity crimes are seen to be highly price elastic 
and their evolution through time is very sensitive to prices. For these crimes, which have been 
rising as their prices have been rising by much more than price inflation, we show there to be 
sizable crime-price elasticities, for metals in excess of unity, and that rising world commodity 
prices over the time period we study played a big role in the rise of these crimes. 
 Therefore to conclude, we find that crime is responsive to goods price changes. The 
evidence of price responsiveness implied by the significant crime-price elasticities we uncover is 
very much in line with the way in which changing returns to crime in the standard Becker/Ehrlich 
model are formulated as a driver of crime. More generally, we view our findings as offering 
strong evidence that changing economic incentives matter for criminality from a different 
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Figure 1: Examples of Changes in Crime Shares and Prices 
(a) (b) 
Notes: Indexed change in the share of total items stolen by these two types of goods on a monthly basis from January 2002 to December 2012. The initial 
crime share for audio players in January 2002 is 0.19 while for watches it is 0.05 (where the shares add up to 1.00 across the 44 categories in our 44 consumer 
































































Correlation = 0.76 (P = 0.00)
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Figure 2: Trends in the Numbers of All Crimes and Metal Crimes 
Notes: Levels of crime for the balanced, 44-good consumer goods product panel and the 7-good group of metals (copper, lead, aluminium, gold, silver, brass and 
other metal). The left vertical axis measures the total number of monthly items stolen for the consumer goods product panel, while the right axis records the total 
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Figure 3: Average 12-Month Changes in Log(Crime) and Log(Prices) For Matched MPS Panel - 
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Correlation = 0.54 (P = 0.00)
British Crime Survey, 21 Stolen Items
Notes: Average 12-month change over ten years in log(crimes) and 
log(price) per good across all 44 consumer goods panel. Some 
labels (mostly on relatively small crime categories) have been 
omitted for space reasons. 
Notes: Change in log(number of stolen items) and log(value) 
for the 21 consistently reported item groups available across the 
two BCS cross-sections for 2002-2012. Some labels (mostly on 








Notes: Price elasticities calculated for one-digit product group goods categories (see Appendix Table A1 for more detail on product group classifications). 
Calculated for the one-digit group from a full seasonally adjusted, within-groups specification with month-year time effects (i.e. comparable to column (3) of 
Table 2). Black bars indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level or better. Robust standard errors used for inference.  
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Figure 6: UK and World Prices for Jewellery (Gold) and Fuel (Oil), 2002-2012 
(a)        (b) 
 
(c)        (d) 
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Correlation = 0.99 (P = 0.00)
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Correlation = 0.85 (P = 0.00)































World Fuel Price UK Fuel Price
Correlation = 0.77 (P = 0.00)
12-Month Log Changes: UK Fuel and World Fuel Price
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Figure 7: UK Scrap Metal Prices and World Metal Prices  
(a)        (b) 
   
(c)        (d) 
  
Notes: The left figures show indexed levels (January 2002 = 1). The right figures show analogous 12-month differenced plots.  The UK price is the scrap metal 
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Correlation = 0.98 (P = 0.00)
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Correlation = 0.92 (P = 0.00)






















World Copper Price UK Scrap Copper Price
Correlation = 0.98 (P = 0.00)
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Correlation = 0.95 (P = 0.00)




Figure 8: 12-Month Changes in Log(Crime) and Log(Prices), Jewellery and Fuel, 2002-2012 
 
(a)        (b) 
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Correlation = 0.27 (P = 0.00)
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Correlation = 0.53 (P = 0.00)
12-Month Log Changes: Fuel Crime and Fuel Price
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Figure 9: 12-Month Changes in Log(Metal Crime) and Log(Scrap Metal Prices), 2002-2012 
 
(a)        (b) 
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Correlation = 0.54 (P = 0.00)
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Correlation = 0.73 (P = 0.00)




Figure 10: Recursive Estimates of Metal Goods Elasticities, Log(Metal Crime) and Log(Scrap Metal Prices), 2002-2012 
 
(a)         (b) 
   
 
Notes: Metal and copper crime-price elasticities estimated recursively, starting with the last 50 observations (October 2008 – December 2012) and then adding an 
extra month and iteratively re-estimating the model until all observations are used (i.e.: until January 2003 with T = 120 observations). The Table 7 IV model 
























































































Table 1: Changes in Property Crime Shares,  









IN 2012 (%) 
 
ET Mobile Phones 8.8 31.6 
LA Bicycles and Accessories 4.6 8.8 
JA Necklace / Pendant 1.9 5.1 
JC Watch 1.3 4.2 
JB Ring 1.0 4.3 
JD Bracelets 1.0 2.9 
JE Earrings 0.5 1.9 
TA Hand Tool – Power 0.5 5.9 
GA Foodstuff 0.3 1.7 
ER Battery / Charger 0.2 0.4 








SHARE IN 2012 
(%) 
    
EA Audio/Radio/Hi-Fi/CD -8.5 2.8 
HA Records/CDs/Tapes/DVDs -2.9 0.6 
EB TV/Video/DVD/Projectors -1.9 2.3 
SB Optical Equipment -1.0 1.8 
TB Hand Tool – Mechanical -0.8 1.0 
AA Ladieswear -0.6 2.6 
GD Drink – Alcoholic -0.6 2.2 
DA Cosmetics / Drugs -0.6 3.3 
AB Menswear -0.5 3.3 
AD Toiletries -0.5 0.5 







Notes:  This Table reports property type codes and names in the matched, balanced panel (2002-
2012) of MPS data that have experienced the ten highest and ten lowest increases in their share of 




Table 2: Baseline Estimates of Crime-Price Elasticities - 
Metropolitan Police Service Monthly Data, 44 Matched Goods, 2002 to 2012 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Log(Crime) Log(Theft) Log(Burglary + Robbery) Log(Crime) 
     
  
Log(Price) 0.348 0.348 0.346 0.413 0.254 0.106 
 (0.130) (0.132) (0.138) (0.155) (0.123) (0.047) 




     0.692 
      (0.061) 
Long-Run Elasticity 
     0.342 
      (0.140) 
       
Goods Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes No No No No No 
Year Fixed Effects Yes No No No No No 
Month*Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month*Goods Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
      
Number of Products 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Number of Observations 5,808 5,808 5,808 5,808 5,808 5,764 
 






Notes: The sample is a panel of 44 matched products with matched crime and price data. The dependent 
variable Log(Crime) is the log of the total count of stolen items for each product across the major crime 
types of thefts, burglary and robbery. The variable Log(Price) is the log of the consumer price index 





Table 3: Estimates of Crime-Price Elasticities Allowing For Price Dynamics 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log(Crime)  
 
    
Log(Price) 0.346 0.193 0.165 0.164 
 (0.138) (0.138) (0.086) (0.085) 
Log(Price)(t-1) 0.156 0.087 0.085 
 
 (0.101) (0.077) (0.078) 
Log(Price)(t-2) 
  0.099 0.091 
 
    (0.080) (0.045) 
Log(Price)(t-3) 
   0.004 
    (0.091) 
     
Long-Run Elasticity 0.346 0.351 0.352 0.352 
 (0.138) (0.140) (0.140) (0.142) 
     
Goods Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month * Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month * Goods Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of Products 44 44 44 44 
Number of Observations 5,676 5,676 5,676 5,676 








Table 4: Estimates of Reporting Rate Sensitivity and Crime-Value Elasticities,  
British Crime Survey, Annual Data, 2002 and 2012 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
















Log(Value) 0.118 0.018 0.421 0.518 
 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.216) (0.278) 
     
Product Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   
  
Number of Products 21 21 21 21 








Notes: The sample is a two year panel (2002 and 2012) of 21 stolen items reported in the British Crime Survey 
(BCS). To ensure there is a good enough sample size the 2002 sample covers stolen items reported from crime 
victimizations reported in 2001, 2002 and 2003 BCS and 2012 covers those from the 2011, 2012 and 2013 BCS. 
and the products with matched crime and price data. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the share of 
reported items stolen and in columns (3) and (4) is Log(Crime),  the log total count of stolen items for the 21 items. 
Log(Value) is the log of mean reported replacement value of that item. Standard errors clustered by stolen item 




Table 5: Descriptive Statistics, Commodity-Related Goods, 2002-2012 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 Annualised Change 
in Crime (%) 
Annualised Change 
in UK Prices (%) 
Annualised Change 
in World Prices (%)  
 
   
A. Consumer Prices Panel    
 
All Crimes (44-good Panel) 
 
-3.5 1.4 - 
Jewellery -0.5 10.8 16.3 
    
Fuel 21.8 10.0 14.3 
    
B. Metal Crimes    
 
All Metals 11.1 12.0 12.6 
    
Copper 29.3 15.3 15.7 








Notes: Annualised percent changes in crime, UK prices and (where relevant) world prices. The 
jewellery category includes the following MPS property groups (and code): Necklace/Pendant (JA), 
Ring (JB), Bracelet/Bangle (JD) and Earrings (JE). The All Metals group comprises Copper, Lead, 
Aluminium, Gold, Silver, Brass and Other Metals.  The world price attached to jewellery is the gold 
price and the world price attached to fuel is the oil price. The top row reports the numbers for the 44-




Table 6: Estimates of Jewellery and Fuel Crime-Price Elasticities,  
Metropolitan Police Service Monthly Data, 2002 to 2012 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
OLS OLS Reduced 
Form 




OLS OLS Reduced 
Form 




 ∆12Log(Crime) ∆12Log(Crime) ∆12Log(Price) ∆12Log(Crime) ∆12Log(Crime) ∆12Log(Crime) ∆12Log(Price) ∆12Log(Crime) 
 
        
A. Jewellery         
∆12Log(Price) 0.563   1.248 -0.205   1.479 
 (0.168)   (0.395) (0.314)   (0.898) 
∆12Log(World Price)  0.304 0.244   0.191 0.129  
  (0.089) (0.037)   (0.104) (0.026)  
F-Statistic 
  43.90    24.39  
Time Trend No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
 
        
B. Fuel         
∆12Log(Price) 0.699   0.626 0.708   0.657 
 (0.096)   (0.110) (0.098)   (0.106) 
∆12Log(World Price)  0.229 0.365   0.240 0.366  
  (0.050) (0.046)   (0.052) (0.046)  
F-Statistic 
  63.77    62.20  
Time Trend No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
 




Notes: OLS and instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the models relating 12-month changes in jewellery and fuel crimes to 12-month changes in prices for each, where the world 
commodity price (gold price for jewellery, oil price for fuel) is used as the instrument. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 7: Estimates of Metal Crime-Price Elasticities, 
Metropolitan Police Service Monthly Data, 2002 to 2012 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
OLS OLS Reduced 
Form 




OLS OLS Reduced 
Form 




 ∆12Log(Crime) ∆12Log(Crime) ∆12Log(Scrap Price) ∆12Log(Crime) ∆12Log(Crime) ∆12Log(Crime) ∆12Log(Scrap Price) ∆12Log(Crime) 
 
        
A. All Metals         
∆12Log(Scrap Price) 1.349   1.320 1.427   1.493 
 (0.114)   (0.143) (0.133)   (0.143) 
∆12Log(World Price)  1.333 1.010   1.587 1.063  
  (0.151) (0.050)   (0.148) (0.051)  
F-Statistic 
  412.85    422.13  
Time Trend No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
 
        
B. Copper         
∆12Log(Scrap Price) 1.657   1.756 1.700   1.812 
 (0.128)   (0.146) (0.136)   (0.154) 
∆12Log(World Price)  1.752 0.997   1.811 0.999  
  (0.134) (0.040)   (0.136) (0.042)  
F-Statistic 
  636.99    578.61  
Time Trend No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
 




Notes: OLS and instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the models relating 12-month changes in metal and copper crimes to 12-month changes in scrap metal prices for each, where the 




Table A1: Crime Recording Information System (CRIS), 2002-2012 
 



















       
A Clothing   10 0.036 0.040 0.034 0.877 
B Publications 4 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.802 
C Currency and Official Documents 13 0.261 0.288 0.210 na 
D Cosmetics and Drugs 4 0.017 0.172 0.015 0.972 
E Electronic and Electrical 21 0.194 0.191 0.232 0.804 
F Weapons 5 0.001 0.001 0.000 na 
G Food and Drink (inc Alcohol) 7 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.862 
H Furnishing & Household Accessories 22 0.018 0.026 0.012 0.665 
J Jewellery 10 0.060 0.055 0.083 0.887 
K Personal Bags and Cases 8 0.101 0.107 0.086 na 
L Leisure Equipment / Vehicle 
Accessories 
19 0.056 0.038 0.072 0.505 
M Metal Commodities 7 0.003 0.001 0.006 1.000 
N Personal and Vehicle Documents 12 0.091 0.089 0.080 na 
P Office and Art Materials   8 0.004 0.005 0.003 na 
R Building Materials 16 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.525 
S Photographic and Scientific Equipment 5 0.030 0.029 0.024 0.309 
T Building Tools 10 0.030 0.037 0.036 0.816 
V Pets and Animals 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 na 
W Public Property, Fuel and 
Miscellaneous 
15 0.071 0.050 0.078 0.148 
 
 
     
 Overall Statistics      
 (1) Share Matched (balanced panel)  0.368    
 (2) Share Non-Matched (unbalanced)  0.108    
 (3) Share Rare / Unusual  0.033    
 (4) Share Non-Market  0.492    
        
 
Source: London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). This Table reports the one-digit categories used by the MPS as 
part of their Crime Record Information System (CRIS). The shares in columns (4)-(6) are calculated with respect to 
the total count of thefts across all types of property stolen. Column (7) the share of property stolen in each 1-digit 
category that has been matched into the balanced panels we use for the main analysis. These property shares are 
weighted according the total amount of crime per 2-digit code (i.e. this represents the share of property crime that has 
been matched). The lower panel breaks down all property stolen on a crime-weighted basis across four groups. These 
groups are: (1) Share Matched (balanced panel), the share of goods matched to price data across both the Consumer 
Goods and Commodities panels; (2) Share Non-Matched (unbalanced), the share of goods with incomplete data on 
either crime or prices; (3) Share Rare / Unusual, goods such as animals, objects of art and weapons that cannot be 
feasibly matched to a price series, and (4) Share Non-Market, goods such as credit cards and personal documents (e.g. 
licenses, passports) that cannot be classified as tradable products on either the retail or the second-hand markets. The 
letters “na” mean “not applicable” to convey that the goods in the corresponding 1-digit group are either Non-Market 
or Rare / Unusual.    
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Table A2: Example of Matching Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Goods Categories to 
Office of National Statistics (ONS) Item Codes 
 
(1)  (2) 
MPS Goods Category for Clothing  ONS Match for Two Digit Code AC Children’s Wear 
MPS Goods Code 
(2-digit) 
MPS Category 





ONS Item ID 
Label Description 
AA Ladieswear  510324 Trousers (suitable for school) 
AB Menswear  510328 Boy’s Jeans (5-15 years) 
AC Children’s Wear  510330 Babygro or Sleep Suit 
AD Sportswear  510336 Girl’s Skirt (5-15 years) 
AE Protective Clothing  510340 Girl’s Fashion Top (12-15 years) 
AF Fur  510341 Child’s Trousers (18 months – 4 years) 
AG Footwear  510342 Girl’s Summer Jacket 
AH Clothing Fabric  510343 Girl’s Winter Jacket 
AJ Uniform  510344 Girl’s Trouser (not denim) 
   510345 Boy’s Branded Sports Top 
   510346 Childs Jumper 
 
Notes: This Table shows an example of how we have matched the MPS goods categories codes to the ONS retail price 
index item id codes. Column (1) shows the level of 2-digit detail available within the overall 1-digit Clothing category 
within the MPS data. Column (2) then shows an example of the 6-digit item ids that have been matched to the MPS 
“Children’s wear” category. Hence our matching by label description process is facilitated by the level of detail 







Table A3: “Price Pass-Through”, World Commodity and Domestic UK Prices, 2002-2012 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Log (Domestic UK Price Index) Log (Scrap Metal Prices) 
 Jewellery Fuel All Metals Copper 
 
        
Log (World Prices)
 0.507 -0.104 0.321 0.129 0.878 1.122 0.966 0.887 
 
(0.028) (0.147) (0.046) (0.101) (0.040) (0.204) (0.037) (0.120) 
 
Log (World Prices)(t-1)  0.633  0.207  -0.253 0.082 
 (0.145)  (0.087)  (0.192)  (0.113) 
        
  
Number of Observations 131 131 96 96 131 131 131 131 









Notes: Ordinary least squares regression results between local goods prices (the ONS price index in the case of jewellery/fuel and scrap 
metal dealer prices for all metals and copper) and the corresponding world commodity prices. For each good the first column shows the 
contemporaneous period effect, while the second column includes also a one-period lagged variable for world metal prices. All equations 




Table A4: Metal Crime-Price Elasticities, Lead and Aluminium,  2002-2012 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 






 ∆12Log(Crime) ∆12Log(Crime) ∆12Log(Scrap Price) ∆12Log(Crime) 
 
A. Lead     
∆12Log(Scrap Price) 1.884   2.170 
 (0.233)   (0.233) 
∆12Log(World Price)  2.274 1.048  
  (0.203) (0.061)  
F-Statistic 
  292.06  
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 66 66 66 66 
 
B. Aluminium     
∆12Log(Scrap Price) 1.526   1.606 
 (0.218)   (0.256) 
∆12Log(World Price)  1.990 1.239  
  (0.337) (0.080)  
F-Statistic 
  239.78  
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 120 120 120 120 
 






Notes: OLS and instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the models relating 12-month changes in lead and 
aluminium crimes to 12-month changes in scrap metal prices for each, where the corresponding world metal 
commodity price is used as the instrument. All models include a time trend and are therefore directly comparable to 




Figure A1: 12-Month Changes in Log(Crime) and Log(Prices), Mobile Phones and Bicycles, 2002-2012 
 
      (a)        (b) 
   
     




















































Mobile Phone Crime Mobile Phone Price
Correlation = 0.62 (P = 0.00)



































Bicycle Crime Bicycle Price
Correlation = 0.45 (P = 0.00)
12-Month Log Changes: Bicycle Crime and Prices
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Figure A2: UK Lead and Aluminium and World Lead and Aluminium Prices  
(a)        (b) 
   
(c)        (d) 
  
Notes: The left figures show indexed levels (July 2007= 1 for (a), January 2002 for (b)). The right figures show analogous 12-month differenced plots.  The UK 


























World Lead Price UK Scrap Lead Price
Correlation = 0.89 (P = 0.00)



































World Lead Price UK Scrap Lead Price
Correlation = 0.92 (P = 0.00)


























Aluminium Crime UK Scrap Aluminium Price
Correlation = 0.87 (P = 0.00)































Aluminium Crime UK Scrap Aluminium Price
Correlation = 0.79 (P = 0.00)
12-Month Log Changes: UK Scrap and World Aluminium Price
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Figure A3: 12-Month Changes in Log(Metal Crime) and Log(Scrap Metal Prices), 2002-2012 
(a) (b) 



























Lead Crime UK Scrap Lead Price
Correlation = 0.72 (P = 0.00)
































Aluminium Crime UK Scrap Aluminium Price
Correlation = 0.45 (P = 0.00)
12-Month Log Changes: Aluminium Crime and Price
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